With both houses of Congress now having passed a Wall Street reform bill, the action now moves to the conference committee. There, House and Senate negotiators will work to finalize a bill with new regulations for the financial services industry, and report back for a final Congressional vote. Annie Lowrey runs down the participants:
The conference committee is comprised of senior members of the committees that worked on the bills. In this case, that means the House Financial Services Committee, the Senate Banking Committee and the Senate Agriculture Committee — expect to see Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.), Rep. Spencer Bachus (R-Ala.), Sen. Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) and Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.) as well as Dodd, Lincoln and others. The committee will prepare a “conference report,” splitting the difference between the House and Senate bills; the House and Senate approve the report and then, once signed by President Barack Obama, the bill becomes law. Frank, the head of the House Financial Services Committee, says he expects that done by July 4.
What can the conference committee change? It cannot introduce any new language to the bill. It can only adopt either House or Senate measures, or split the difference between the two. (That said, if the bill needed new language coming out of conference committee, there are ways to tack it on.)
As Michael Greenberger told me, “I’ve seen Phil Gramm do wonders in a conference committee.” If the committee really wanted to make changes, they could tack it on without a whole lot of trouble. Nobody ever got voted out of office because of changes in a conference committee.
The House and Senate bills are broadly similar in the abstract and quite different in the specific. The best of the House and the best of the Senate bills would still not produce an earth-shattering, world-historical piece of legislation, but it would lay an OK down payment on a safer, saner financial system. It would not break up the banks or truly end the casino on Wall Street to the extent that it could have.
Some of the bigger pieces, like resolution authority or shareholder say on pay, are pretty much the same in the bills, so that won’t change. And some Senators are already protecting their language, saying that the conference committee cannot differ much from their version. Let’s take a look at the major issues that might:
• The Volcker rule. Contrary to some media reports, there is a “Volcker rule” in the Senate bill; it essentially authorizes a study and tells the regulators to come up with something on it. This is but one of the 28 “studies” in the bill. The House bill passed before there was such a thing as the “Volcker rule” in the lexicon, so that’ll probably be the best we can get here. But we should at least get that.
• The Fed. The House bill has a full annual audit of the Federal Reserve; the Senate bill has a one-time audit of emergency lending facilities. In addition, the Senate bill allows a much bigger role for the Fed than the House version; in fact, the Fed gained more power while the Senate bill was on the floor. Some of that could be reeled in if the House language is adopted.
• Derivatives. Everyone expects the 716 provision, which forces the mega-banks to spin off their swaps trading desks, to be excised in conference. But Michael Greenberger believes something like it will be retained. The House’s derivatives piece is a mess and nearly useless, but Barney Frank has admitted a mistake on that front, and wants to preserve strong rules against derivatives, like in the Senate bill.
There’s also the matter of Maria Cantwell’s main complaint, that the mandate of all trades going through clearinghouses is unenforceable. Obama Administration officials appear to think this is a misreading of the legislation, and that Cantwell’s fix could have unintended consequences. So it looks unlikely that this loophole will be closed, if the major players in conference don’t think it’s a loophole.
• The CFPA. The House bill has an independent Consumer Financial Protection Agency with a compromised, exemption-riddled mandate. The Senate bill has a CFPA inside the Federal Reserve but without as many exemptions. Both bills include some pre-emption of state consumer financial protection laws, though the Senate bill preserves a role for the state Attorneys General in enforcement. A mix of both of these would be preferable. The Senate motion to instruct conferees will urge adoption of the auto dealer exemption from the CFPA, which is in the House bill, but given the Administration’s position there is almost no chance that conference will adopt that.
• Capital requirements. The House bill, in its strongest plank, has a hard 15:1 leverage cap for financial institutions. The Senate bill leaves capital requirements and leverage up to the regulators, although the Collins amendment does force bigger banks to have stronger requirements. The more distinct and specific the language is, the better. And the bank lobbyists will work hard to get the opposite, pure discretionary language.
• Credit rating agencies. There were two competing options for the rating agencies: end the conflict of interest by giving government more of a role, or end the rating agency process altogether. The Senate kind of opted for BOTH approaches, with the Franken amendment empowering an SEC bureau to assign initial ratings to qualified agencies, and the LeMieux amendment eliminating the qualified “seal of approval” for the rating agencies. Franken insists they’re compatible. The House has language similar to the LeMieux amendment. If possible, the Franken amendment should be retained.
• Mortgage underwriting. Both bills actually have some pretty good new standards for mortgage lending, banning the premiums for pushing borrowers into riskier loans, and forcing some ability to pay. This is likely to stay in the bill.
• Interchange fees. One of the toughest measures in the Senate bill changes the swipe fees charged to local merchants when their customers use debit cards. The bank lobbyists will have their knives out for this one.
There are probably a lot more provisions, but that’s what I can come up with right now.
UPDATE: Bloomberg reminds me of one piece I forgot:
Negotiators will have to reconcile differences over a pre- paid $150 billion fund created by the House bill to cover the government’s cost of unwinding a failing financial firm. The Senate bill requires the industry to repay the government only after a company collapses. Frank said yesterday he wouldn’t push to keep the industry-financed pre-paid fund in the bill.
“The two bills are very similar, and the House is ready to go to conference to work out the remaining issues,” Frank said in a statement. “I am confident that we can have a bill ready for President Obama’s signature very soon.”
Frank’s obviously showing that he’ll relent on this, which means that the banks would have to pay for their own bailouts after and not before a crisis emerges.





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“Frank’s obviously showing that he’ll relent on this, which means that the banks would have to pay for their own bailouts after and not before a crisis emerges. ”
Vampire squid. So, Frank’s OK with the banks putting a gun to our head next time. Good to know. This bill sure has a lot of words in it for something that does nothing, but I guess that’s the intent.
Vote. Them. Out.
We really need “none of the above” on our ballots. The big brains in DC would have to figure out what to do if nobody won.
I’m having a real hard time trying to give a damn about yet another POS bill produced by our incredibly corrupt president and Congress.
Yes absolutely.
Slightly off topic, but why is Bill Clinton speaking out against the bank tax on foreign soil?
Jane has a fresh cross-post already in progress: Revolt of the Wonks: Former Obama Advisors Want To Know What’s Happening on His Deficit Commission
Resolution authority: joke, like trying to resolve a bomb after it has gone off.
Shareholder say on pay: joke, it’s nonbinding, right?
Volcker rule: lame joke, a study on it? Even if fully implemented, still a joke because traders would just blur the difference between proprietary and agency trading.
The Fed: anything less than full and ongoing audits is a joke. I’m guessing that the language will look more like the sellout Sanders version which means we won’t get meaningful in-depth understanding of what the Fed was doing around the meltdown. We get nothing about the run up to and bursting of the housing bubble because the audit starts after all that, and we won’t be able to see what the Fed does for the next crisis, which is coming. As for vesting the Fed with any regulatory authority after their massive fails for both the housing bubble and meltdown, very sick joke.
Derivatives: As I believe Greenberger noted the mega-banks own 90% of the derivatives. BTW they also own the exchanges like ICE. So how I wonder could they spin off their swaps trading desks without breaking them up? And does anyone seriously expect that to happen? As I noted at the time, the darkest and most dangerous derivatives like CDS and naked CDS would not be required to be exchange traded. Yet another joke, a particularly dangerous one.
The CFPA: It was gutted in the House and muzzled in the Senate. Neither gives the CFPA the power to require financial institutions to offer plain vanilla products to their clients and customers. As for federal pre-emption, this would make federal regulation, even if weaker, controlling. It is a really bad idea. Joke.
Capital requirements: I would favor 12:1. I don’t know if SIVs could be used to end run the cap. But you know a leverage cap is only part of what’s needed. If leverage is used to go into bubbly crap investments or if assets are allowed to be given inflated valuations, a leverage cap doesn’t get you much. Joke
Credit rating agencies: It would really depend on what went into the initial government sponsored rating. If it was generic, it might be close to meaningless. Then too, as we have seen with the SEC, it could become a handmaiden of the financial industry. Taking off the seal of approval has some possibilites but only if there is a clear assignment of liability to everyone involved: underwriters, buyers, the ratings agencies themselves. Neutral.
Mortgage underwriting: We need plain vanilla mortgage writing standards. Anything short of that is an invitation to gaming the system.
Interchange fees: This one actually looks like it has some merit. It would hardly change or save the financial system but it is a good idea. The key is to know what the limits on the fees will be.
$150 billion fund: see my first comment. Anyone think you can unwind a TBTF with a $150 billion? Anyone remember the multi-trillion bailouts of the Fed the last time a not quite TBTF Lehman went splat
The “unintended consequence” of Cantwell’s amendment the WH is afraid of is the actual enforcement of the law mandating transparency in derivatives trading. If the banks were forced to trade openly, where counterparties could see the prices others are paying for similar products, their huge profit margins on these deals would disappear overnight. That’s why the WH is so adamant about not enforcing those provisions – bank profits are far more important than either market transparency or the soundness of the broader economy. Without the Cantwell amendment, derivatives trading will remain hidden, just like the most dangerous part of an iceberg.
You are not alone. The US political pendulum swings only between the oppressive right and the fruitless center.
Turns out that “Change we can believe in,” is “Whatever cosmetic alterations will pacify the rubes without doing diddly to tick off the oligarchs.”
Ummmm -
http://rt.com/About_Us/Programmes/Keiser_Report/2010-05-18/571486.html
Excellent post
I believe they already have Resolution authority – but this makes it explicit – and banks pay (or rather repay) is a game if we continue with giving out money at zero interest while borrowing and paying 3% – pre-pay something is a must.
Volcker rule “study” – I thought gave regulator authority to invoke result of study – is this wrong?
I disagree on Fed audit – I agree it should be annual but expanding it into policy kills the concept of the independent Fed. Vesting the Fed with regulatory authority already exists – having a consumer agency inside the Fed can work of the people involved are straight arrows.
I agree that CDS and naked CDS – and synthetic or naked anything – should be required to be exchange traded. Yet how that is put in is not clear.
Federal pre-emption worked in ERISA – except in the few cases where it did not work – a state safety valve seems like a good safety valve.
On Capital requirements I TOTALLY agree with you that this can be conned by the EITF and FASB who are in the back pocket of corporations – SIVs are only one of the ways I can come up with to drive a truck through this – it needs much tighter lanuage.
The Senate credit rating agencies approach must be kept – IMO.
The rest of your comment I have not worked with so I can not comment.
But again – thanks for the excellent post.