Near the end of our foreclosure panel, we finally got into the meat of the situation: what it will take given a government unwilling to do more for struggling borrowers to actually reset the broken housing market. With HAMP’s complete failure – to date only $250 million of the $75 billion promised by the program has even been spent, and leaders are reduced to begging for more modifications – and the inability of bankruptcy judges to force loan modifications out of the servicers using cramdown, really the only prospect left for these homeowners is to default. That’s not the breaking of a contract but the honoring of it. When the homeowner cannot make the payments or decides the investment isn’t worth it, they turn the house back over to the bank. It’s implicit in the contract, and it’s a typical, normal business tactic taken by all kinds of small businesses and corporations over the years.
Just a quick perusal of this CRS report on foreclosure mitigation programs shows them to be completely impotent to stop the problem, which reached record levels in the second quarter of this year. Even the tweaks to HAMP made by Treasury haven’t changed the basic “wish and a hope” structure of the program (not the bolds, which are mine):
Another change to HAMP is that participating servicers will be required to consider reducing principal balances for homeowners who owe at least 115% of the value of their home. Servicers will have to run two net present value tests for these borrowers: the first will be the standard NPV test, and the second will include principal reduction. If the net present value of the modification is higher under the test that includes principal reduction, servicers have the option to reduce principal. However, they are still not required to do so. If the principal is reduced, the amount of the principal reduction will initially be treated as principal forbearance; the forborne amount will then be forgiven in three equal amounts over three years as long as the borrower remains current on his or her mortgage payments. The Administration will also offer incentives to servicers specifically for reducing principal. This change is not yet in effect, but the Administration expects it will be operational within a few months of the date it was announced.
Everyone who has tried to make this voluntary system work must know that they are operating without a hammer, a legitimate incentive (not the relatively weak cash outlay HAMP offers) to the banks, in the form of a stick and not a carrot, to implement the modifications. Cramdown could have been that hammer, but a captured Congress decided against it. So all that’s left as leverage for someone facing foreclosure is the threat to walk away. This is way Fannie and Freddie, along with Congress, are trying to punish strategic defaulters, as they have been termed, by denying them FHA-backed loans (basically all non-jumbo loans) for seven years.
There’s a moral component to this. Basically, people in trouble are being told they’re bad people for considering getting out of their predicament. They’re being compared to welfare queens and demonized in the elite media. As a result you turn houses into debtor’s prisons, a point reiterated by civil rights leader and organizer Gerald Taylor on a separate panel about the financial sector. “They are trying to bully and punish average folk and put them in a modern-day debtor’s prison,” Taylor said. “The banks won’t do it on their own. This change won’t happen unless we create a crisis.”
Not everyone will up and leave their home, nor will they have to. It’s the threat of leaving that will lead to the kind of sensible loan modifications needed to reset the market. Homeowners simply have no other leverage. You can already see Bank of America and others instituting modification programs that are in many ways better than HAMP, and threatening to leave, which would cause major writedowns, had a lot to do with it.
Strategic defaults are supposed to go against the American ideal of fairness. But what is more American than starting over? Elizabeth Warren made the point on the panel that our bankruptcy laws have created the innovative, nimble economy we have, because it allows entrepreneurs to fail without life-threatening economic consequences. Homeowners need this kind of backstop and right now they don’t have it.
The other option is leaving behind a substantial chunk of the middle class, particularly racial minorities and the elderly, people with a lot of equity in their homes. And everyone else, too, because without resetting the housing market, the economic crisis isn’t likely to resolve itself. The choices are clear – wait it out and disrupt the lives of millions permanently, or walk away, and get a new start on life.




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I’m still trying to find the link but I read one official say that HAMP was never meant to save homes, but to serve as a model or decision tool for lenders and borrowers.
That came as a surprise to me, as I think it would to most Americans.
Good article and a great point regarding the fact it’s not breaking a contract, it’s honoring it. While the lenders and FHA are scrambling to push scare tactics on the public, major corporations are walking away left and right from upside down commercial property THEY own with little or no backlash. Tishman in NY walked from a 5.4 billion, yes, billion, dollar apartment complex and Morgan Stanley “returned” 5 buildings to the lender.
However the article should state it’s not wise for a homeowner to stop payments, give the lender the finger, and walk away. The laws vary state by state and there are tax implications to defaulting as well. A friend of mine went through this company – http://www.strategicdefaultinformation.com – who set him up with an attorney and CPA to do it correctly. There’s a number of people right now dumping their houses who are in for a shock a year or two from now when the IRS comes knocking.
Are you are just trying to drum up business for this web site?
I notice you are playing the fear of the IRS card.
We are all victims.
I listened to the panel. At one point Professor Warren said that what the big banks are doing to people “is a sin”. That is a moral component applied to the super citizen corporations, who have the rights of humans but not the souls. Their actions can kill people, but their isn’t a corporate death penalty.
It would be useful if some of the major religions could talk about the morality of walking away in their faith, vs. the morality of walking away in the capitalism faith.
I would default just on general principle, but that’s me. I think people need to realize the value of their houses are not going to go up, and that there will be many many defaults in the future. Somebody’s got to pay for the bubble, do you want to do it, or do you want the banks to?
Tactically, it’s complicated depending on where you live, a lawyer is likely a good idea but this is a good site to give you some information on your options.
http://www.loansafe.org/forum/foreclosure-laws/4130-recourse-v-non-recourse-states.html
http://www.loansafe.org/forum/
The rich are already doing this in vast numbers. Only the middle class and the poor are being pressured to continue paying on a failed, bankrupt investment.
I see nothing wrong with giving the asset back to the bank that, through the mortgage indemnity, actually owns it anyway.
Another David Dayen post is upstairs!
As Insurers Game the Medical Loss Ratio, Key Members of Congress Weigh Steps to Fight Back
I can’t agree with the portion in bold. If you can afford to pay the mortgage debt, then you should. Walking away when the mortgage debt is more than the fair market value of the house, as some are doing in non-recourse states such as Arizona, is not right.
http://www.loansafe.org/forum/deed-lieu-foreclosure-do-you-need-help-walk-away/
There is nothing wrong with refusal to be the bagholder. Seems to me the bankers at Chase, Citi, and Wells haven’t taken a pay cut. They got a bailout on our tab already, why would anyone but a sucker pay them twice?
Then why fund it with $75 billion?
OK, consider this situation. Someone with a net worth of $10 million has a home with a $4 million mortgage that now has a fair market value of $3 million. Do you think that person should be able to walk away without recourse?
I don’t. Apparently, you do.
When your house is worth less than you paid for it (or much less than the mortgage is written for), the investment is not worth it.
Eli is upstairs!
Maybe Now The Right Will Take Climate Change Seriously
Wasn’t there a study recently showing higher income types more likely to SD? The same elite who want to fuck over the rest of us.
So, you think I should be able to borrow money for 10 investments, the 5 that turn out well I get to keep and the 5 that are losers I get to walk away from?
Apparently I do. What is the difference between a rich person defaulting, and someone with less ‘disposable’ income. The rich should give out freebies to banks because it doesn’t affect them as much? How much of their taxes are paying Goldman’s bonuses?
No sale on your hyperbole, sorry.
When a party walks away from their mortgage contract and the bank seizes the property, only those two parties suffer the repercussions of their transaction. Borrowing involves risk to the borrower. Lending involves risk to the lender. Neither should involve risk to the bystander.
This is much less of a “welfare” solution than either cram-down or governmental bailout. Walking away has the added feature of allowing homes to find their market value again.
That’s what Goldman did with AIG, on your and my tab. We’ve already paid the banks for ‘our’ mortgages, a sucker pays twice.
Cleverly designed policy ineffectiveness is the quintesscence of Chicago (feel-good capital of America) politics. I came here straight from reading this article pondering the mysterious, and ponderous, inability of the city to get recycling policy anything like workable. I felt overprepared.
Sample:
The article is a bit long, but I suggest at least bookmarking it. You’ll be amazed, amused, and appalled. You’ll have a giddymaking sense of deja-vu.
Look, the walk away non-recourse route is a boondoggle for the upper- middle class and the wealthy. It does next to nothing for the middle-middle class and the lower-middle class. The value of their non-exempt assets is generally near zip.
In a word: baloney.
Non recourse is non recourse, it means the same rich or not – non recourse.
There’s a sucker born every minute, I’ve heard.
It seems so.
Hah.
Just stand right there and hold this bag, I’ll chase the snipes down the trail, won’t be long…
I’m not sure how “who benefits” changes things much. If two parties voluntarily enter into a legal contract, that’s their business – not the public’s. If there were fraud at some point, that’s a different matter entirely but those charges should be proven individually in court.
He’s right. The IRS can claim the bank’s loss is your gain and you owe taxes on the gain. So give up the house but get advice first.
I don’t think any of us have all the controlling laws at hand to answer these questions. The IRS will certainly have an interest if you are making money on this. I am not sure morals means much here. It certainly didn’t seem to matter to the folks on WS or to the home owner for that matter when they bought the house.
Snipes? I don’t think so.
http://southeastfarmpress.com/news_archive/long-on-cash-short-on-character-0726/
No, that is not true. There is a special write-off for crammed down mortgages. Or for people who walk away from them. This is an irs regulation and some states have it, too.
Aunt Elly says: When you look around the poker table, and you can’t see who the mark is, it’s you.
Here is the link at the IRS for Home Foreclosures and Debt Cancellation.
Well, yes, you do “get to” keep your winning investments. And yes, your investments that lose value they will never regain, and are likely to lose more value yet, you do “get to” liquidate, such that — to the maximum extent permitted by law — your salvageable gains are maximized, and your losses and liabilities are minimized.
Banks, which see the mortgage contracts they sign for the investment instruments that they are, do precisely this. It’s ridiculous to expect the counterparty homeowner to do otherwise.
Investments that lose money are tax write-offs, too.
Most people don’t have million-dollar houses, and they can’t afford the lawyers to get them out from under the mortgage, either. So they get stuck with no money and no credit, because they were trying to keep their houses.
My argument is straightforward. People who can afford to service their debt should.
The arguments advanced here against this basic proposition seem less than compelling analyzing them either economically or ethically. But, pehaps, I am missing something. It wouldn’t be the first time.
If the amount by which the house is underwater is greater* than the legal consequences of walking, then there is no economic argument against doing so. (Consult your lawyer first!!) The only thing one could be left with perhaps would be reputational damage bad enough that one could never borrow again. Let’s see how much of that persists in the current environment.
As to the ethical, well I suppose that is a matter of belief, but certainly to the above considerations a person ought to add at least (1) the alternative uses of those funds for oneself and family, given that they now are demonstrably beyond what is needed to secure the services and benefits of the house; (2) the possibility that a later misfortune makes one have to tap one’s assets, but of course the house (trust me, the typical notional house is going to remain uw for a while) be an untappable burden on the balance sheet, while one have less cash or other assets than in walkaway world to confront the trouble.
When one considers the different scenarios rooted in both opportunity (more to help kids to college, better quality family time, fewer sacrifices to Mammon under the guise of working) and risk mitigation (more savings), it does not seem self-evident to me that dogging out a mortgage on a house that turned out to be as bad a deal as many have is particularly laudable, even though it might provide a conventional sort of comfort to one’s conscience for a time.
And I might add that this is true even if one should have seen how questionable the house deal was in the first place; one should not be ethically obligated to persist in error merely because of one’s original blindness.
______
* Allowances made for unspecified option values.
The economic and/or ethical analysis I was considering wasn’t from the debtor’s perspective, but from society’s.
Of course, I realize that every modern civil society must have mechanisms for relieving unmanageable debt. But, these mechanisms should be rationale. And, to my way of thinking, allowing a debtor to walk away from a debt they can afford to service is not rationale.
I think you are making this a lot more complex than it is.
A bank lends money against a house. They hold a security interest in the house until the loan is repaid. They don’t necessarily hold an interest in all the assets of the borrower (some loans *are* structured this way). If, after the fact, society places an obligation on the borrower to repay, even when the value of the security is less than the borrowed amount, you are increasing the amount of security for the bank (house value + borrower’s ability to repay). You are *changing* the terms under which the money was lent. You are changing the deal.
If the value of the house had risen, should the banks reduce the interest rate charged because the riskiness of the loan had dropped? Or if the income of the borrower went up? That would be consistent with your assertion.
Giving the bank a second bite at the apple isn’t moral at all. The whole reason that lenders usually overcollateralize loans is to protect against decreases in the value of the security they hold. They took a decrease into account at the beginning. In hindsight, they didn’t overcollateralize enough; but that was their business decision.
Look at the products the industry began offering for a while there…low downpayment mortgage products (functionally this means undercollateralization). They were betting values would hold up; they didn’t. Lenders are left holding the bag if their risk assessment is wrong. That’s what a secured loan is all about.
When you submitted your mortgage application, there was a question: “Do you intend to live in this property?” If you answered “yes” to this question, you probably got a lower interest rate. The reason for this is that the lender made the assumption that you were less likely to default than a commercial borrower. Homeowners typically are a little less cold-blooded about servicing debts on non-producing capital than a commercial entity is, and therefore a better risk.
When you’ve got lots of homeowners suddenly acting like businesspeople, you increase the lenders’ risk. That’s fine; it’s certainly legal (and there’s a reason why morality doesn’t enter into contracts). But it also means that the lender is going to charge a higher risk premium in the future, so mortgage interest rates will be higher (probably a lot higher once the bubble in government paper pops). Add to that all the additional costs incurred by the finreg legislation, and this “jinglemail” phenomenon (love that term) is just another reason why the golden age of home ownership is probably at an end. I suggest you all brush up on the meaning of the term “landed gentry”.