The International Crisis Group has a new report out showing that the so-called reconciliation talks with the Taliban are actually going nowhere, and that civil war could result from a US continuing to lead those talks. The think tank believes that responsibility should shifted to the United Nations.
In a report released Sunday, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group said that current negotiations were unlikely to achieve a sustainable peace because they were dominated by the U.S. and hampered by a “half-hearted and haphazard” approach by the Afghan government.
“Far from being Afghan-led, the negotiating agenda has been dominated by Washington’s desire to obtain a decent interval between the planned U.S. troop drawdown and the possibility of another bloody chapter in the conflict,” said the report.
The ICG said that the result thus far of international involvement in negotiations had been to embolden “spoilers” like insurgents, government officials and war profiteers, “who now recognize that the international community’s most urgent priority is to exit Afghanistan with or without a settlement.”
In a way, this is a recapitulation of an argument that the Bush Administration made in Iraq, that you cannot set a date certain for withdrawal, because “they’ll wait us out.” But it’s compounded by the Obama Administration having the modus operandi in the talks, according to the ICG, of just getting out with the roof still intact and putting enough space between withdrawal and the roof collapsing that it can be blamed on somebody else. That’s highly cynical, but not much would surprise me at this point.
I think it’s clear that US policy is moving toward an exit from Afghanistan, while the elements of a civil war stay in place there. What I’m less clear about is whether the US can really do anything to stop that. Our presence has arguably fueled the civil war rather than prevented it. But a peace negotiation between the Taliban and the Afghan government that doesn’t involve the Afghan government just won’t work over the long term. I don’t know that the “Afghan government” really even exists outside the borders of Kabul, however, which is another drawback.
The ICG is basically calling for a loya jirga, which involves all ethnic groups to come to an agreement, rather than just a narrow set of warlords and power brokers. I’m not sure what the UN can do to broker peace, but some third party acceptable to everyone needs to deal with the aftermath of withdrawal. Unless we’re just up and leaving again, sowing more hatred, the kind that created the Taliban in the first place.




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There are a number of available third parties who have been brokering a regional framework for Afghanistan. One of these is the parties to the Istanbul Statement, which included China, Iran, Pakistan, and of course, Turkey. Another is the China-Russia allied Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Yet another is the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
The convening of a fully representative loya jirga (the one in 2001-2002 was boycotted by the Taliban) makes a lot of sense. The brokering organization will still have a major effort in order to get the regional warlords, the Northern Alliance, the supporters of the current government, and the various factions of the Taliban to come to an agreement. And the most difficult part of the agreement will be the composition of the armed forces.
The beginning of US withdrawal when the loya jirga begins its sessions could be an incentive to move forward with this. An peace force of non-interested Islamic countries could potentially be the guarantor of peace during the transition period from the current government to the new government under whatever agreement was reached by the loya jirga.
Whatever happens, China does not want to see an unstable Islamic state on its western border. There will be strong diplomacy with the factions by the frontline states.
President Karzai must leave office Dec 7, 2014 so soon he will be a lame duck, if he isn’t already, besides having little power outside Kabul. The leading candidate to replace Hamid Karzai is the self-styled “Afghan Opposition Leader” Abdullah Abdullah who ran against Karzai, before dropping out, in the last election.
Abdullah has been an adviser and friend to Ahmad Shah Massoud, legendary anti-Taliban leader, the United Front’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and served as Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister from 2001 until 2005. He represents the India/Tajik/UnitedFront bloc which is against the Pakistan/Taliban bloc in Afghanistan. Look for Pakistan and the Taliban to express their disappointment with this eventuality.
Oh — Abdullah is the head of the ‘Change and Hope Movement’ in Afghanistan. Who says history doesn’t repeat?
Afghanistan is still key to the US Central Asia policy. The only thing that’s clear is that the US doesn’t have a friggin’ clue what’s involved in this, by all indications. The reliance upon the blathering of the latest general acting as viceroy there – fourth general in three years — is a good indicator. “”We’re on track” General Allen told the senate committee. “Tied to the tracks and the train’s fast coming” is more like it.
The US has a Central Asia policy besides “forward deployment” and big footprints?
As generals, we’ve had a string of William Westmorelands who are attached to something that can never be — effective US counterinsurgency. They long to win the Vietnam War. Not one of them has figured out that you gotta know the culture and speak the language in order to succeed with that. The generals are all scrambling not to be the last one there.
The election is not until 2014. Abdullah Abdullah becomes president only if there is an extraordinary unity government formed (extraordinary in that it picks him for “unity”).
A civil war is not out of the question, but I think all of the frontline states are going to be working hard to avoid having another failed state there.
Absolutely, THD — the New Silk Road strategy
Remarks (excerpts)
Robert O. Blake, Jr.
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
Houston, TX
January 19, 2011
Energy-Rich Central Asia
We also aim to expand our cooperation and engagement with Central Asia.
For many Americans this part of the world is primarily defined by the challenges we face in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but it is also marked by great promise and opportunity. Central Asia lies at a critical strategic crossroads, bordering Afghanistan, China, Russia and Iran, which is why the United States wants to continue to expand our engagement and our cooperation with this critical region. And South Asia, with India as its thriving anchor, is a region of growing strategic and commercial importance to the United States in the critical Indian Ocean area.
In total, the region is home to over two billion people — roughly one fourth of the world’s population. It is incredibly diverse, ranging from the crowded metropolises of India and Bangladesh to the vast stretches of unpopulated steppe in Kazakhstan.
The Silk Road once linked the South and Central Asian regions through an extensive trade network. Cultural and political linkages came later. Timur, whose legacy still holds strong in Uzbekistan, established a strong cultural link between these regions in the late 14th century when his armies conquered Multan and Delhi. He planted the seeds of the powerful Mughal dynasty that would later go on to produce cultural marvels like the Taj Mahal in India.
Today, however, the region is one of the least integrated in the world, as I experience every time I travel to the region, when I often have to transit through Istanbul, Moscow or Dubai to get from one Central Asian capital to another.
With rapidly growing economies like India, emerging markets in Bangladesh and Kazakhstan, and resource-rich countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, greater linkages in this region would bring tremendous benefits to its citizens, as well as the world.
Administration Priorities
Given this dynamic regional context, we have three primary objectives in the South and Central Asia region:
· Support international efforts in Afghanistan;
· Build a strategic partnership with India; and
· Develop more durable and stable relations with the Central Asian countries.