Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, wrapped up today in Baghdad and the best news from the meeting is that there will be another round of talks, in Moscow, next month. As long as the two sides keep talking, something good could transpire.
The third round of talks would hone in on a uranium enrichment freeze and a potential fuel swap, where Iran gets their enriched uranium for civilian nuclear energy from the outside:
The talks, according to U.S. and European officials, will be focused on freezing Iran’s production of enriched uranium to 20% purity—a level deemed dangerously close to weapons grade—and shipping its stockpile of the nuclear fuel out of the country.
The diplomatic bloc negotiating with Iran, which is comprised of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany, is offering Tehran economic and diplomatic inducements in a bid to constrain its nuclear program [...]
In particular, Tehran has sought a scrapping or a delay of an EU oil embargo set to be imposed on July 1, according to Iranian officials. This action is expected to endanger as much as a third of the Iranian government’s annual revenues.
“The Iranians were not wowed” by the P5+1′s offers, a senior U.S. official said late Thursday. But the diplomat said negotiators had flexibility to come up with new inducements heading into the Moscow talks.
Under international law, Iran has the right to freely enrich uranium to 20% which is still considered low-enriched uranium. So they are clearly being pushed into this position by the financial sanctions, including the oil embargo.
I can see the P5+1 asking for the constraints on uranium enrichment for essentially nothing, and I can see the Iranians asking for not just the dropping of the oil embargo but far more inducements. Without being in the room, I cannot know. But at any rate, while there are differences, both sides are talking, which is an improvement over the shouting from earlier in the year.
Catherine Ashton, the lead negotiator for the European Union, who hilariously calls the negotiating team the “E3+3″ (i.e. Britain, France and Germany, representing Europe, along with the US, China and Russia) instead of the P5+1, made this statement upon the close of the negotiations:
In line with our agreement in Istanbul, the E3+3 laid out clear proposals to address the Iranian nuclear issue and, in particular, all aspects of 20% enrichment.
We also put ideas on the table on reciprocal steps we would be prepared to take.
Iran declared its readiness to address the issue of 20% enrichment and came with its own five-point plan, including their assertion that we recognise their right to enrichment.
Having held in-depth discussions with our Iranian counterparts over two days – both in full plenary sessions and bilaterals – it is clear that we both want to make progress, and that there is some common ground. However, significant differences remain. Nonetheless, we do agree on the need for further discussion to expand that common ground.
This is generally where you would expect things to be in a legitimate negotiation. The proposals are serious and not a set of unreasonable demands.
Juan Cole believes that this round of diplomacy is having the beneficial impact of averting war:
The sanctions and threatened blockade have brought Iran to the negotiating table. But the Iranian state, as opposed to the Iranian people, is not terribly worried about the Western sanctions, since its petroleum income is sufficient to buffer the government from unrest at anything above $54 a barrel, well below the current price. The state, in short, is still getting rich even with the sanctions, and can evade the blockade by using soft currencies like the Indian rupee and by resorting to barter trades (oil for wheat, e.g.). The Iranian state probably is sufficiently cushioned from the sanctions that state actors will not be harmed by even the stringent US sanctions. Thus, Tehran doesn’t absolutely need to make urgent concessions, though it does want to show some flexibility, in hopes of getting the sanctions dropped or at least softened (especially the UNSC sanctions, since Iran wants to separate out the uber-hawkish US government from its United Nations Security Council colleagues.
The main good thing about the talks is that as long as they continue, they make it hard for anyone to start a war.
And that’s definitely the outcome the world should seek.




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Excellent analysis, really good.
Yes, 20% enriched is not highly-enriched. I think most people don’t know that (I didn’t, honestly). HEU is >20%. Anyhow there are no enrichment limitations at all in the Iran Safeguards Agreement.
The sole function of the IAEA according to the NPT treaty and the Safeguards Agreement is “for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons. . .”
BASIC UNDERTAKING
Article 1
The Government of Iran undertakes, pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty, to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
The IAEA has consistently and frequently reported: “The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.”
…Thus, Tehran doesn’t absolutely need to make urgent concessions, though it does want to show some flexibility, in hopes of getting the sanctions dropped or at least softened (especially the UNSC sanctions, since Iran wants to separate out the uber-hawkish US government from its United Nations Security Council colleagues.
The main good thing about the talks is that as long as they continue, they make it hard for anyone to start a war.
Exactly, and MJ Rosenberg truly expounded upon that needed schism…
…There is a fundamental absurdity hanging over negotiations with Iran, and I fear it could doom the whole enterprise.
It is the position of AIPAC as adopted by the Congress of the United States. This president is likely to only go as far as AIPAC (or the Israel lobby at large) will permit him to go. Given that the Iranian government is aware of that fact and given that it knows that the lobby has been agitating for war for a decade, it can hardly be a surprise that Iran is not particularly responsive to our demands. It understands that the U.S. demands are AIPAC’s (ultimately Prime Minister Netanyahu’s) demands and it knows that there will be no satisfying them.
There are so many ironies here, the first being that AIPAC (and the Congress that is under its sway) is far more hawkish than the Israeli military and intelligence communities, not to mention the Israeli public.
As for the U.S. military, it is well-known that it opposes war much like President George W. Bush, who refused to give Israel permission to attack because he feared the consequences…
…The Israel lobby is the cloud hanging over the Iran talks. Even today, as the Iran talks reconvene, three Senate lobby stalwarts — Joseph Lieberman (I-CT), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), John McCain (R-AZ) — have an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal demanding that the Obama administration accept nothing less than zero uranium enrichment by the Iranians, even though that train left the station a long time ago. That is, of course, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position, one designed to sabotage talks, not to advance them…
I’ve seen “Middle East Peace Talks” as a headline for as long as I can remember. The goal of Israel is not, and has never been, peace.
You will either prostrate yourself before them, while begging for forgiveness, or they will kill you and steal your land. And maybe will anyway.
As opposed to Israel’s neighbors, Arafat, et al who really want/wanted peace. Give me a break.
I’d say imposing further sanctions as the talks began had the desired effect. Iran would have simply used this as yet another stalling tactic otherwise. They still might, but the sanctions clearly got their attention.
One needs to question the sincerity of the talks by the P5+1 with Iran. The P5+1 have instituted legally dubious sanctions coupled with their almost daily threats of war, which are internationally perceived as illegal. If the talks fail to hammer out an agreement, what’s next? A blockade of Iran’s oil shipments? If the talks fail, the P5+1 will have missed a golden opportunity to avert war.
Arms Control Wonk (re 20 % enrichment)
Dr. Jeffrey Lewis:
“Iran’s announcements that it is going to produce 20 percent Highly Enriched Uranium is bad news ”
“Glenn Kessler has a news analysis on the implications of the deal, in which David Albright explains why Iran could go from 20 percent HEU to a bomb in relatively short order:
Meanwhile, enriching uranium under the guise of medical needs will get Tehran much closer to possessing weapons-grade material. Iran insists it has no interest in nuclear weapons. But Albright said 70 percent of the work toward reaching weapons-grade uranium took place when Iran enriched uranium gas to 3.5 percent. Enriching it further to the 19.75 percent needed for the reactor is an additional “15 to 20 percent of the way there.”
Once the uranium is enriched above 20 percent, it is considered highly enriched uranium. The uranium would need to be enriched further, to 60 percent and then to 90 percent, before it could be used for a weapon. “The last two steps are not that big a deal,” Albright said. They could be accomplished, he said, at a relatively small facility within months.”
explanation for lay folk is at; http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2620/iran-to-enrich-20-percent-leu
Since most of the work has been done enriching to 4%, then it matters little if some uranium is enriched to 20%. That destroys all the concern about 20% enriched uranium, it seems to me. As the song says — it’s only a matter of time. And not much time, at that.
from the NYTimes:
Uranium ore has about 140 atoms of the heavy isotope for every light one, and separating the two takes a lot of spinning. By the time the enrichment process has reached 4 percent, it has successfully removed some 115 of the heavy atoms.
To get from there to 20 percent — the enrichment goal of the Iranians — the spinning centrifuges need remove only 20 more of the heavy atoms. And from there it is even easier to jump to 90 percent, bomb grade, by removing four or so additional heavy atoms. (end)
hvy:lt
140:1 raw U
25:1 4%
5:1 20%
1:1 90%
What have I left out?
Ya still have 75+% of the way to go for any real nuke capability…! And as most Nuke experts state, it gets much more difficult, and, time/energy consuming as you get further along in the process…! *gah*
At what point, do you think that the IAEA’s continuous reporting of the non-diversion of the nuke material, begin to sink in…?
Seriously…
Full access
The IAEA’s May 26 report comes in two parts. The first deals with the on-going nuclear programme and the second with the accusations of past plans to convert nuclear material for military purposes. On the on-going programme, the IAEA gives Iran a clean bill of health. The report details how Iran’s nuclear programme is continuing, that the cascades of the fuel enrichment plants are being improved, and are more modern than previously, and that Iran is producing more nuclear fuel than before.
The IAEA makes clear that it has full access to these programmes. Referring to Iran’s two nuclear fuel plans, the Fuel Enrichment Plant, FEP, and the more modern Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, PFEP, the IAEA reports bluntly that: “all nuclear material, as well as all installed cascades, remains under Agency containment and surveillance”. It further reports that “since March 2007, fourteen unannounced inspections have been conducted.”
So let’s be clear — is this another case of Albright flat-out lying?
It wouldn’t be the first time…! ;-)
Uranium Science 101…
Gaseous diffusion…
…in other words uranium with a reduced concentration of U-235. The high amount of energy required to force the UF6 through the porous membranes makes the gaseous diffusion process expensive.
Centrifuge…
…The U-235 concentration is gradually increased to 3 – 5% as it passes through the successive stages of centrifuge cascades. Enrichment using centrifuge technology requires little energy, giving this method a significant cost advantage. Centrifuge requires only about 2% of the energy needed for gaseous diffusion.
They do utilize the cheaper centrifuge methodology, but it is still extremely costly and time consuming, to produce the pellets necessary for a bomb, muchless produce the needed material for their Bushehr Reactor… “It takes about 100,000 SWU of enriched uranium to fuel a typical 1,000 megawatt commercial reactor for one year, which can supply the electricity needs for a city of 600,000 people.”
The IAEA does say the Iranians only possess about 100 kg’s of the 20% material…!
Thanks. Who’d have thought that any semi-intelligent blogger would have to contest so-called “experts” in uranium enrichment?
Another area I was trying to research: Some people, including some physicians, are advocating the non-use of HEU in medicine, and the use of LEU instead. So is 20% U even necessary in Iran, or are there alternatives processes that could use LEU?
This (link)and this (link)are two things I looked at. But I’m way over my head.
Altho this is dated it still is very pertinent…
…This allegation has technical and logical flaws that are not discussed by the highly biased and ignorant US media. Centrifuges at the Natanz facility in Iran are not set up for efficient enrichment to the level of 90%. Pipes have to be redesigned and new connections have to be made to get the cascades ready for efficient refinement to the level of 90% for bomb grade uranium. Moreover, the LEU product is under the strict control of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Any change in the cascades’ configuration or tap into the accumulated LEU would be noticed by the IAEA cameras, sensors and frequent inspections within minutes. The re-piping efforts would take months to finish and the US decision makers would have ample time to get the world community to support drastic measures to stop such illegal activity…
The only thing that’s changed is Amano’s appointment…!
For the uninitiated, David Albright is a highly-probable Israeli agent who is doing Israeli business under the name of “Institute for Science and International Security.” He periodically, frequently, comes out with anti-Iran “evidence” supporting the US/Israel position that Iran is a threat to mankind, thus qualifying no doubt for the US Medal of Freedom.
Even though the US has fully-monitored Iran with seismographs, drones with photo and seismography capabilities (no doubt), and satellite coverage, etc., it was David Albright who was able to come up with satellite images of supposed water puddles outside a building at an Iranian military installation PROVING that Iran was developing nuclear weapons.
From #7 above, it looks like Albright might be working with others.
I’ll check it. Thanks again — very good info.
Remember, also that Stuxnet had wrought it’s destruction on the Iranian centrifuges, since…!
If you have time, check out my exchange with “John Schilling” here.
About the only thing I agree with Schilling about, was his side remark…
…Coincidentally, one first-generation Iranian centrifuge will deliver about one SWU of enrichment work per year. Takes about 3000 SWU to make a bomb’s worth of weapons-grade uranium from scratch.
They’ve still got a long ways to go, for any viable amount, and still have to dodge all those 24/7 IAEA installed cctv’s…! *gah*
The flat-out lying about Iran certainly approaches, or surpasses, the lying about Iraq. Truth is the first casualty of war — Sy Hersh wrote a book about it.