For half a second I felt like I was being too hard on Ben Bernanke and his Jackson Hole speech. Mr. Market certainly thinks it presages another round of quantitative easing, with stocks up big today. And it’s considerate Fed-speak to merely hint and nod at a policy change before embarking on it, probably at the September 13 meeting.
But all of that went away when Joe Weisenthal got to the heart of his disappointment in the speech, and really in Bernanke’s tenure as well as the whole of the economic policy apparatus. To the extent that something will get done, it will be at the margins, and really the same exact margins that has led to unresponsive and inadequate monetary policy for years now. They’ve missed their inflation and employment targets, and blaming the lack of fiscal accommodation from the federal government, while true, only gets you so far when assessing Ben Bernanke’s jobs.
Indeed there are other “unconventional unconventional” monetary policies that Bernanke could be pursuing, but none of those ideas made an appearance in his remarks today. Morgan Stanley’s Vincent Reinhart gives just one example:
The main possibility for surprise is if he addresses the ongoing work within the Fed on conditional policy rules. The last set of minutes referred several times to discussions of rules and more open-end policy commitments. Up to now, the Fed has been using its policy instruments in an unconditional way, in that it announces a program of fixed duration and fixed amount. Most academic work, as will be discussed in the formal program at Jackson Hole, suggests that a rule linking the policy instrument to economic outcomes or the outlook performs better. The idea is that the Fed could agree, for instance, to keep the funds rate target at zero as long as they have an economic forecast that is short of their mission.
And there are other ideas in this space as well. But crucially, it appears from Bernanke’s actions that going out on a limb with some operation beyond QE would necessitate him essentially acknowledging that past actions failed. And he spent an entire speech today defending past actions.
Weisenthal puts it best here:
But from a bigger picture, the general tendency of political and financial leaders has been to: Do what it takes to stave off economic tail risk (collapse) but not take the steps that would actually accommodate robust growth or end the crisis.
In Europe especially, there’s a lot of going 90% of the way there, but not doing the actual difficult thing that would turn the corner, which is why the crisis goes on and on and on. There’s no total collapse. Just ongoing misery.
In the US, we haven’t had a double dip, but very few folks are thrilled with the economy.
So that’s basically Bernanke’s speech. Yes, he does enough. He provides a ‘put’ that makes markets feel good the bottom won’t foll out. But there’s nothing very exciting.
Just enough is not good enough. Especially because the status quo ante has seen a shrinking of the Fed’s balance sheet, mainly through attrition. So a QE program of asset purchases would recapture some of that, but would not even reach the full potential it will claim.
The problem is that pretty much every economic policymaker sees it as their job to avoid total collapse, while ignoring the massive waste of human capital that comes with a slow-growth status quo. This ship sailed a long time ago, but it doesn’t get any less frustrating.




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Human capital is so yesterday.
There is nothing the Fed can do. The Fed only controls interest rates, which are already at record lows.
QE may actually be disinflationary, because it removes interest income from the economy.
Yes. The model is slavery, Comprador.
Thanks:)
Yes crazy ben is doing just what needs to be done to keep the wheels on until after the election then who cares for we know he and his boss don’t.
I don’t know what the fed can do. Short interest rates are already zero. He could buy long bonds and lower the rates there and hope that sparks the market. But then long rates are what pension funds rely on. Open to ideas here. What we need is more stimulus, but we been there, done that? And of course that would increase the deficit.
The Fed’s big mistake was fueling a decades long credit bubble. Now they’re caught in an epic liquidity trap. Money velocity is now LOWER than it was at anytime during the 1930s. That’s quite a feat for a Fed Chairman that’s made a career out of being the Depression’s Monday morning quarterback.
They irk you? This is where the Dayen politesse and 3 degree divergence from the party line leave me a bit cold.
Everybody with any power supposedly has their hands tied. From our point of view, this is a monumental failure of leadership on every front, from the corporate boardrooms to the halls of Congress to the Courts to the White House to the Fed to the mass media.
From their point of view, it’s a fight to preserve their enormous profits and bonuses and kickbacks, with no concern for how much misery they cause. They are not even accountable to one another unless the whole scheme is threatened from within their ranks.
Actually, it is more likely a failure of capitalism that won’t be finished until the monetary system self-destructs. This will begin with the world’s other major economies’ abandoning of the dollar. The US response will be military reprisals — exactly what happened to Saddam & Ghadaffi. Also, the planet can’t take much more plundering, so there will have to be a contraction of the economy to avoid further disaster. Something has to give.
Dissolve the FED, repeal all FTAs, and regulate the banks by repealing the Clinton Era legislation known as the Financial Services Modernization Act and the Commodities Futures Modernization Act.
Someone, comrade. Many Someones.
Don’t forget a jubilee, comrade. I’d love to see some of those asshole stockbrokers working in the community garden striving for the longest cucumber.
Yah. We should have had austerity a long time ago. Mmph.
Capitalism is fraud.
Sorry, not a good-natured remark. For me, Bernanke is–simply–the enemy.
If being irked is your strongest reaction to Bernanke, then you should consider yourself lucky. I can’t even look at that drawing of him without wanting to do that which description of would no doubt get me banned from this website.
Alt views of how monetary policy works. I suppose most have no idea how the standard model says it is supposed to work but anyway….
quote
http://wallstreetexaminer.com/2012/08/31/mainstream-economists-do-not-understand-how-monetary-policy-is-transmitted/
Fed Monetary policy actions are transmitted to the economy via the trading accounts of the Primary Dealers and the markets. That’s how money begins its path to reaching bank reserves and economic activity. The dealers are the transmission mechanism. The markets are the transmission mechanism from the dealers to the economy. The Primary Dealers get the cash first. They are the only deciders of how to distribute it. The only exception to this rule is when the Fed uses unconventional policy actions to lend directly to the end users, as it did with its alphabet soup programs beginning with the TAF in 2007 and 2008.
We saw how well that went when the Fed deliberately circumvented the usual Primary Dealer transmission pipeline. Things only turned up when the Fed began QE, a large scale program to pump reserves into the system via the traditional means- purchases of securities from the Primary Dealers.
When the Fed purchases Treasuries or MBS from the Primary Dealers, it credits the dealers’ accounts at the Fed for the purchase. Therefore, the first response to any Fed direct policy action is the decisions the dealers make about what to do with the cash via the markets. The cash comes in through their trading accounts and it leaves the same way. It’s their money. They can use it to buy Treasuries, and they do. They can use it to buy other bonds, and they do that sometimes.
They also make markets in everything else. They are the worldwide big dogs in every kind of market. They are the house. They can buy stocks; they can buy commodities; and they do, and they can finance their hedge fund customers, and they do that
quote
http://www.prudentbear.com/index.php/creditbubblebulletinview?art_id=10702
It is worth noting that the hedge fund community has expanded about 20-fold since, to a record $2.1 TN. Global derivatives markets have mushroomed to hundreds of Trillions. Importantly, derivatives markets as well as the global “leveraged speculating community” have continued to grow post-2008 crisis – only further bolstered by aggressive policy regimes. The failure of JPMorgan’s “whale” derivatives trades to garner the attention of regulators (prior to their disclosure) does not inspire confidence that the Federal Reserve can satisfactorily gauge the amount of leverage or other risks that have accumulated in the amorphous world of global securities and derivatives markets.
That non-traditional monetary policy tools today work similarly to how traditional measures functioned historically is one of the great policy myths of this period. There remains this notion, again furthered by chairman Bernanke, that some quantity of quantitative easing (additional debt purchases/liquidity creation/Fed balance sheet growth) today would equate to, say, a 25 bps point cut in the Fed funds rate 25 years ago. Yet the entire monetary policy transfer mechanism has been radically altered, foremost by the transformation of system Credit expansion from primarily bank-loan driven to one dominated by marketable debt and myriad risk intermediation channels.
Traditionally, central bank stimulus would entail adding reserves into the banking system to effectively reduce the cost of funds, thereby incentivizing additional bank lending. Today, Federal Reserve monetary stimulus is transmitted primarily through incentivizing risk-taking and leveraging in the securities, derivatives and other risk asset markets. We now have about 20 years experience in support of the thesis that there exists a powerful interplay between activist central banking, marketable debt and financial speculation. Yet the Fed somehow seems to ensure that its analysis avoids addressing the associated risks of an ever-increasing Federal Reserve role in the pricing and trading dynamics of an ever-expanding quantity of securities, derivatives and market speculation.
The media continue with this focus on the timing of the Fed’s QE3 announcement. This now seems archaic.